A four-dimension comparison (determinism, replaceability, identity boundary, operational cost) between Groundlane's controlled remote MCP contract and traditional local approaches (WebFetch, stealth_fetch, puppeteer, requests), with verifiable scenario recommendations.
A reproducible checklist of the most common operational pitfalls: truncated results from fixed caps, selector errors tied to DOM stability, render-mode cost/determinism tradeoffs, version-change verification (v0.1.0 preview), and the non-negotiable security boundaries (URL policy, auth, concurrency, budget).
Approvals default to smart mode: an auxiliary model waves through low-risk commands, auto-denies genuinely dangerous ones, and escalates the uncertain cases to you. Neither `--yolo` nor `approvals.mode: off` can disable the hardline blocklist (`rm -rf /`, fork bombs, `dd` to a physical disk), and `approvals.deny` is its user-editable counterpart, evaluated before yolo. Upstream is explicit that the threat model is an honest-but-wrong agent, not an adversarial process.