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Drones Have Closed Taiwanese Airports 23 Times, and Airports May Only 'Enforce Against'

Three Legislative Yuan budget evaluations log 23 drone-caused airport closures in Taiwan between FY2019 and August 2023, and every row's response column repeats one sentence: on notification, go to the scene with the Aviation Police and investigate. Article 99-13(6) of the Civil Aviation Act gives an airport the verb 'enforce against', not 'stop or remove' — yet the FY2024 report says every airport has already procured handheld jammers.

Power Plants and Fabs Have No Row in the Civil Aviation Act's Authority Table

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 99-13 of the Civil Aviation Act say 'government agencies, schools or legal persons', but paragraph 7's proviso — the only sentence letting a site operator 'take appropriate measures to stop or remove' a drone — says only 'government agencies', and Taipower, CPC and the fabs are legal persons. Their remaining path is to have a municipality announce a restricted zone and 'enforce against' violators, which drops the penalty from an NT$300,000 minimum to an NT$300,000 maximum, while importing a jammer requires 'critical infrastructure provider' status that you learn you hold by receiving a letter.

Who May Bring a Drone Down? Taiwan's Law Authorises the Outcome and No Means of Achieving It

'Drone' appears in 19 of Taiwan's central statutes and regulations; 'counter-drone' appears in exactly one, and that one is a procurement act. Six settings are authorised to 'stop or remove' an intruding drone and none of them says by what means — Article 99-13 of the Civil Aviation Act says only 'take appropriate measures', while the 31-item police instrument list includes mortars but no jammer, and Article 67(1) of the Telecommunications Management Act has no public-duty exception.

Why Countering Drones Is Hard: Jamming Is Failing, and Taiwan's Problem Isn't Only Technical

Electronic warfare has one structural limitation: it needs a signal to attack. Fiber-optic control emits no radio, satellite links bypass ground jammers, and AI terminal guidance needs no link at all for the final leg — three methods systematically defeating jamming, which is why defense is shifting toward interception. Taiwan carries an extra layer: a Control Yuan investigation documents the Ministry of National Defense revising its drone response SOP three times in two months, from "may shoot down" to "flare warning only, first shot requires the Minister's authorization" and back to "shoot down with 7.62mm or smaller." That is not a technology problem.