I had filed "what's the real margin on military-grade-commercial tenders, and how long is the cash cycle" under questions requiring interviews. The published filings answer both, more precisely: gross margin runs 35–39%, normal for hardware; but operating expenses consume it, and operating income has been negative for three straight quarters while reported net income came from non-operating items. The real constraint is inventory — roughly 385 days of it, producing a cash conversion cycle near 377 days. The money in this business isn't stuck in margin, it's stuck in inventory.
Taiwan's public drone money splits three ways: an approved NT$44.2B coordination program (R&D grants), a proposed NT$210B defense procurement special statute (stuck in cross-party negotiation), and annual agency budgets (NT$7.2B+ for 2026). The largest was written to run from 1 August 2026 — that date has passed with the bill still unresolved. And the Executive Yuan version buys only three specific items.
Measuring the drone sector against supply chain chokepoint / structural demand / high switching cost / long-term institutional holding: Taiwan sits at the most substitutable layer, 80% of demand comes from public budgets rather than end-user behavior, and only the certification-driven switching cost genuinely holds. The Army's NT$988M counter-drone contract — failed three times, terminated in full, NT$98.78M performance bond forfeited — is the most expensive lesson in why winning a bid is not revenue.